| 01 · IdentityEnforce SSOOwner: Identity admin | Require SAML or OIDC SSO and disable local login where the plan permits it. | Verify supported IdP, enforcement scope, break-glass behavior, and domain claim in the admin console.Verify method: Sign in with an assigned user and attempt a local-login bypass. | Account takeover, orphaned access, or local-login bypass. | Source 1Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 02 · IdentityAutomate SCIM lifecycleOwner: Identity admin | Provision and deprovision users and groups from the authoritative directory. | Verify group mapping, seat removal, token revocation, and plan availability in the contract and console.Verify method: Create, update, suspend, and delete a test user through SCIM. | Account takeover, orphaned access, or local-login bypass. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 03 · IdentityControl break-glass accessOwner: Security | Keep emergency admin access limited, monitored, and tested. | Cursor's public pages do not define a universal break-glass workflow; verify available controls.Verify method: Review named emergency accounts and run a documented access test. | Account takeover, orphaned access, or local-login bypass. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 04 · AuthorizationMinimize admin rolesOwner: Cursor workspace owner | Assign organization roles according to least privilege. | Verify the exact role catalog and permissions in the active workspace.Verify method: Export or review every privileged member and business justification. | Privilege creep or an unreviewed user gaining administrative scope. | Source 1Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 05 · AuthorizationSeparate pilot and production groupsOwner: Platform engineering | Use identity groups and policies to isolate experimental users from production-facing teams. | Verify whether every required policy can be scoped by group.Verify method: Compare membership, repository scope, models, MCPs, and agent rules across groups. | Privilege creep or an unreviewed user gaining administrative scope. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 06 · Data governanceEnforce Privacy Mode org-wideOwner: Security | Enable and enforce Privacy Mode for all covered users. | Verify plan, workspace, account, and client-specific behavior in the console and agreement.Verify method: Inspect the organization setting and test inheritance with a new member. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1, Source 2, Source 3Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 07 · Data governanceVerify training exclusionOwner: Legal and security | Confirm that Privacy Mode excludes customer data from Cursor and model-provider training. | Required: public marketing alone is not sufficient for the buyer's legal requirement.Verify method: Map the public claim to the signed DPA or MSA and active workspace setting. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1, Source 2, Source 3Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 08 · Data governanceVerify model-provider retentionOwner: Privacy | Confirm the zero-data-retention arrangement for every enabled provider and model. | Required: validate provider, model, region, abuse-monitoring exception, and change notification in contract or trust evidence.Verify method: Request the provider matrix and compare it with the model allowlist. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 09 · Data governanceDefine Cursor-side retentionOwner: Privacy | Document retention for prompts, code context, indexes, logs, analytics, support records, and backups. | Unknown until the active agreement, plan, features, and support process are reviewed.Verify method: Build a data-flow and retention table from contract, product settings, and trust evidence. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1, Source 2, Source 3KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 10 · Data governanceReview subprocessorsOwner: Vendor risk | Review Cursor and model-provider subprocessors before rollout and after changes. | Verify contract notice period and objection or termination rights.Verify method: Download the current list, record purpose and location, and test change-notice handling. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 11 · Data governanceConfirm data residencyOwner: Legal and security | Map required regions to actual processing, storage, backup, and support locations. | Public pages do not establish a universal customer-selectable residency option; verify contractually.Verify method: Compare architecture and subprocessor evidence with policy requirements. | Unapproved retention, training, provider, subprocessor, or residency exposure. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 12 · Data protectionVerify encryption controlsOwner: Security | Confirm TLS in transit and AES-256 at rest claims for covered services. | Verify feature scope, exclusions, key ownership, and availability of CMEK in the purchased plan.Verify method: Review trust evidence and, where available, configuration for customer-managed keys. | Protected code or prompts exposed without the required encryption boundary. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 13 · Repository accessApply repository allowlists or blocklistsOwner: Platform engineering | Limit which repositories agents and users may access. | Verify whether policy is allowlist, blocklist, or both and which agent surfaces it covers.Verify method: Attempt access to one approved and one denied repository. | Sensitive repositories or files become available to an agent unexpectedly. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 14 · Repository accessProtect sensitive filesOwner: Repository owner | Use repository exclusions and product policy to keep secrets and restricted paths out of AI requests. | Cursor describes best-effort exclusions; verify residual risk and do not treat ignore files as a secret boundary.Verify method: Run a controlled test against denied paths and inspect client behavior. | Sensitive repositories or files become available to an agent unexpectedly. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 15 · Model governanceRestrict model accessOwner: AI platform owner | Allow only approved models and providers. | Verify new-model defaults, router behavior, provider retention, and change control.Verify method: Compare the console allowlist with procurement and privacy approvals. | An unapproved model or provider receives company code or prompts. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 16 · Tool governanceRestrict MCP serversOwner: AI platform owner | Allow only reviewed MCP servers and remove stale connections. | Verify policy coverage for desktop, CLI, cloud agents, plugins, and user-defined servers.Verify method: Attempt to connect an approved and an unapproved MCP server. | An unreviewed MCP server or credential can perform an external action. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 17 · Tool governanceProtect MCP credentialsOwner: Security | Issue scoped credentials per server and avoid long-lived shared secrets. | Verify where tokens are stored and which administrators or agents can reveal them.Verify method: Inspect the credential store, scopes, rotation record, and revocation test. | An unreviewed MCP server or credential can perform an external action. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 18 · Agent governanceSet global agent rulesOwner: Platform engineering | Configure organization-wide agent policies before broad rollout. | Verify precedence, supported clients, sync timing, and exception workflow.Verify method: Inspect required rules and test behavior with a new user. | Autonomous commands, network access, or prompt injection cross the approval boundary. | Source 1Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 19 · Agent governanceConstrain auto-run, browser, and network accessOwner: Security | Set conservative defaults for autonomous terminal, browser, and network actions. | Verify differences among local, CLI, background, and cloud agents.Verify method: Run controlled allowed and denied actions in each supported agent surface. | Autonomous commands, network access, or prompt injection cross the approval boundary. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 20 · Agent governanceEnforce sandbox policyOwner: Endpoint and platform engineering | Use restricted execution for agent terminal commands where supported. | Verify team-wide enforcement, bypass permissions, platform differences, and known exclusions.Verify method: Test workspace boundaries, temporary-file access, network denial, and escape handling. | Autonomous commands, network access, or prompt injection cross the approval boundary. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 21 · Agent governanceDistribute security hooksOwner: Platform engineering | Use managed hooks to observe or block sensitive agent actions. | Verify server-side distribution, tamper resistance, timeout behavior, and plan availability.Verify method: Trigger before-prompt and before-command hooks with allowed and denied examples. | Autonomous commands, network access, or prompt injection cross the approval boundary. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 22 · Agent governanceTest prompt-injection resistanceOwner: Product security | Exercise untrusted repository, web, issue, and MCP content against the approved configuration. | No public vendor page proves safety for the buyer's exact tools and data; validate locally.Verify method: Run a documented adversarial test with canary secrets and denied tools. | Autonomous commands, network access, or prompt injection cross the approval boundary. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 23 · LoggingEnable and export audit logsOwner: Security operations | Capture access, administrative, rule, and configuration events. | Verify event catalog, retention, API or export, latency, and plan limits.Verify method: Change a test setting and confirm the event appears in dashboard and CSV export. | The organization cannot attribute, investigate, or prove a high-risk action. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 24 · LoggingGovern analytics and API exportsOwner: Data governance | Review adoption, usage, and AI-code metrics without over-collecting employee data. | Verify exact fields and legal basis before enabling broad reporting.Verify method: Inventory dashboard fields, API outputs, recipients, and retention. | The organization cannot attribute, investigate, or prove a high-risk action. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 25 · LoggingIntegrate security monitoringOwner: Security operations | Route available audit evidence into the organization's monitoring and incident workflow. | Verify supported export or API paths and compensate for unavailable events.Verify method: Generate a high-risk test event and trace it from Cursor to the response queue. | The organization cannot attribute, investigate, or prove a high-risk action. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 26 · AssuranceObtain SOC 2 and penetration-test evidenceOwner: Vendor risk | Request current SOC 2 Type II and penetration-test materials from the trust portal. | Required: verify report coverage and bridge letters; certification is not a universal guarantee.Verify method: Record report period, exceptions, complementary controls, and remediation commitments. | Contractual or control gaps remain invisible until an incident or assessment. | Source 1, Source 2Official public basis | 2026-09-12 |
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| 27 · AssuranceConfirm incident notificationOwner: Legal and security | Set contractual notification, cooperation, evidence-preservation, and post-incident obligations. | Public pages do not define every customer's binding incident terms; verify the MSA or DPA.Verify method: Map the signed agreement to the incident response plan and contacts. | Contractual or control gaps remain invisible until an incident or assessment. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 28 · LifecycleTest deletion and offboardingOwner: Privacy and identity | Validate account, workspace, index, token, automation, and retained-data cleanup. | Verify backups, legal holds, logs, shared artifacts, and contract termination handling.Verify method: Offboard a test user and submit a deletion request; record each completion. | Stale access, data, or configuration survives offboarding or a material change. | Source 1, Source 2KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 29 · LifecycleMonitor material product and policy changesOwner: Vendor owner | Track changes to models, subprocessors, retention, security features, and acquisition status. | Verify notification channels and contractual change rights.Verify method: Review vendor notices monthly and compare them with the approved baseline. | Stale access, data, or configuration survives offboarding or a material change. | Source 1, Source 2KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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| 30 · LifecycleMaintain an exit and portability planOwner: Engineering leadership | Keep repository instructions, workflows, evidence, and critical automations portable to another agent. | Verify export availability, data return, deletion, license termination, and dependency inventory.Verify method: Run an annual migration exercise on a representative repository. | Stale access, data, or configuration survives offboarding or a material change. | Source 1KyenAI operational recommendation | 2026-09-12 |
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